Abstract
Introduction
In May 2009, the decades-long conflict in Sri Lanka between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Sri Lankan government came to an end. Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa declared in his victory speech that the Sri Lankan military had freed the country from the clutches of the most powerful terrorist organisation in the world (Rajapaksa 2009b) . Victory was attributed to the humane conduct of the Sri Lankan military: 'Our valiant troops went to battle carrying the gun in one hand, the Charter of Human Rights in the other, and their hearts filled with love for their children' (Rajapaksa 2009b) . However, despite these pronouncements, the war was plagued by widespread human rights violations, war crimes, and torture on both sides (see U Convention against Torture, while the Torture Act (1994) prohibits torture (U. N. Human Rights Council 2008: 12, 21) . Sri Lanka has implemented other legal safeguards such as a complaints and compensation process for those who have been victim to torture, and several commissions that can investigate allegations of torture. 1 In addition, Sri Lanka is party to several major international treaties that prohibit torture. 2 Taking into account these prohibitions, how was torture made possible? This paper is interested in this how-possible question, i.e., I am not so much concerned with why the Sri Lankan government tortured, as to how it was possible for the Sri Lankan government to torture. The former question looks at causation, while the latter is concerned with constitution (Wendt 1998: 104-105 ). The distinction is important for several reasons. Why-questions tend to focus on the beliefs and intentions of actors and show how under certain circumstances, an outcome was predictable (Doty 1993: 298) . These types of questions provide important insight, but in some respects, do not tell the whole story. They take the actor as given, and assume that a practice could take place (Doty 1993: 298) . How-possible questions take the subjects as problematic, paying attention to the social construction of subjects and reality and how this construction allows for the possibility of practices (Doty 1993: 298) .
This article argues that certain discursive constructions made it possible for Sri
Lankan forces to use torture as a practice to help win the war against the LTTE. Focusing predominately on the Sri Lankan government, I show how the Rajapaksa government drew upon terrorist and Sinhalese nationalist discourse to cast the 2006-2009 war as a battle for the survival of Sri Lanka. I examine government speeches, peace and reconciliation reports and interviews to show how these two discourses intertwined to cast the LTTE as a group beyond negotiation and one that needed to be destroyed. The nationalist discourses further exacerbated the violence against Tamils by ranking them in an inferior position in relation to the majority of Sinhalese. In addition to the suspension of civil liberties under emergency legislation, these discursive practices helped encourage torture and other forms of violence.
I have divided this article into several parts. The first section looks at the problem of torture in Sri Lanka and analyses the psychodynamic and discursive practices approach to help understand the possibility of torture. I then look at the role nationalist myths and discourses on terrorism played in creating an environment where violence and torture was deemed possible and necessary to save Sri Lanka. Finally I examine how this national discourse encouraged the escalation of violence among Sri Lankan officials against LTTE fighters.
The Problem of Torture
Torture has been employed against many different ethnic groups in Sri Lanka's history.
When the Marxist Janatha Vimukthi Perumana (JVP) led a violent revolt in April 1971, the government employed torture to gain information and identify JVP supporters (Abeysekara 2001: 35-43; Amnesty International 1973: 150-151 ). Yet in recent years it has been the Tamil How are we to explain this use of violence? A dominant explanation of mass violence has been through the psychodynamic literature. Although this provides powerful insights, I
argue in and of itself it cannot adequately explain the use of torture in Sri Lanka. I argue a discursive practices approach helps ameliorate the shortcomings of psychodynamic explanations by analysing the social construction of actors and the discursive construction of an environment that contributed to torture. This helped justify emergency legislation that suspended civil liberties and helped create a culture of impunity among Sri Lankan officials.
Psychodynamic Approach
Psychodynamic approaches have been popular in explaining the use of mass violence and torture in ethnic and racial conflicts (Casoni and Brunet 2007; Kernberg 1998 Kernberg , 2003a Kernberg , 2003b Volkan 2009 ). Building on the work of Freud, psychodynamic approaches focus on the unconscious drives of egos to explain de-humanisation and its effects. Psychodynamic theorists dismiss the idea that an 'objective' reality exists 'out there' and brings to the fore the social construction of reality. This means that during times of conflict, a group's enemy does not exist a priori to the self, but is socially constructed in relation to the self.
How is the self and other created? One means is through projection whereby we project unwanted images of ourselves onto others (Murer 2009: 115-116; Volkan 2009 ).
Another means is through abjection. This is where we reject a former part of ourselves and the Other becomes a prohibition that is excluded from engagement to prevent the new self regressing and adopting its former unwanted qualities (Murer 2009: 118) . These complex psychodynamic processes can result in a refusal to identify with others and lead to identificatory disengagement, i.e., where other human beings are seen as inferior and nonhuman (Casoni and Brunet 2007: 277) .
Psychodynamic approaches explain these unconscious processes in a group context, focusing on how individuals give up their psychic functioning to the group, influencing individuals who would normally not engage in violence to become perpetrators (Casoni and Brunet 2007: 269) . The group's beliefs and the individual's beliefs are now one; the group thinks for the individual, defines boundaries of morality, and who is included within those boundaries (Casoni and Brunet 2007: 270) . These group processes also incorporate transgenerational transmission of trauma, whereby a historical trauma is 'deposited' in future generations, carrying with it the emotions of humiliation or injustice (Volkan 2001: 87-88 (Weldes and Saco 1996: 371) . Psychodynamic theorists, similar to other psychological approaches, assume behaviour by making correlations between the supposed unconscious beliefs and behaviour (Weldes and Saco 1996: 371) . As I show with a discursive practices approach, this methodology is unnecessary.
Discursive Practices Approach
The psychodynamic approach, by itself, is unable to explain the question of torture during the Sri Lankan war. However, I do not dismiss its value. What I would like to contribute is how a discursive practices approach can help address these short comings and provide a more powerful analysis. How does a discursive practices approach help understand the use of torture during the Sri Lankan conflict?
A discursive practices approach takes the focus away from the unconscious thoughts and beliefs of the individual/collective subject. Instead, a discursive practices approach uses an inter-subjective methodology that focuses on the role of language in constructing reality (see Der Derian 1990; Doty 1993 Doty , 1996 Skonieczny 2001; Weldes and Saco 1996) . Rather than using unconscious thoughts as the starting point, this approach begins with language by showing beliefs of individuals are not meaningful or possible without shared language (Weldes and Saco 1996: 371) . As Doty (1993: 302-303) notes, discourses provide discursive spaces such as concepts, metaphors, or categories that help create 'reality' and make certain practices possible.
A discursive practices approach brings to the fore the fact that discourse has productive power. By this is meant that in creating knowledge and meaning, discourse produces actors and identities and shapes action (Doty 1993; Weldes and Saco 1996: 372) .
However, discourse is not 'controlled' by anyone (Skonieczny 2001: 438) . Discourse is an open, historically contingent autonomous field that operates at its own level (Foucault 2002: 137, 141) . Because of the structure of discourse, meanings are infinite and expanding (Doty 1993: 302) . Statements do not refer back to a signifier but refer to other statements. As Foucault (2002: 111) argues, statements border other statements, each statement has a status, and their relationship between one another determines their meaning. This means that identities are fluid, as actors are constructed and are articulated within a particular discourse (Doty 1993: 302-303 ).
An important qualification is needed here. In saying that discourse constructs reality, I
do not imply that the world is nothing more than imagination, myths or ideas without a corresponding reality. The LTTE and the Sri Lankan government exist in a brute manner;
they have fought one another resulting in the deaths of thousands of people; and both sides have engaged in torture. Rather, through systems of signification, a discursive practices approach makes the ontological assumption that material things by themselves do not convey meaning; rather, people inter-subjectively provide meaning to material things through sign systems. What is constructed here is the ideas that form actor identities; the hierarchical relationship between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government; and the counterinsurgency 'reality' that shapes the possibility of practices. The relationship in which things are given meaning is allocated great importance because it generates relations that help distinguish one object from another (Milliken 1999: 229 (Rogers 1994; Rogers 2004 ). The dominant nationalism on the island is Sinhalese nationalism, which emerged in response to the 'corrupting' influence of colonialism and the claim to be the rightful rulers of Sri Lanka (Brow 1988: 316; Roberts 1978: 373 Contemporary Sinhalese nationalism draws upon many of these myths and is worked on through political speeches, the media, 'planting and harvest rituals' and educational institutions (Brow 1988: 316) . As Skonieczny (2001: 439) has shown, 'myths are important in forming and solidifying a national identity and are often utilized and deployed by policymakers to generate support and elevate the national importance of policy.' In Sri Lanka national leaders invoke the virtue of former Sinhalese Kings, who are idolised as the guardians of the island, to legitimise their authority and policies (Brow 1988: 312-316) .
National leaders are seen to be in charge of protecting Buddhist principles, but also sovereignty, economic development and Sri Lankan way of life (Brow 1988: 316) . This is particularly true of farmers, who are epitomised as an important part of culture on the island (Brow 1988: 316 ; see also Rampton 2011: 260).
The second major discourse is fighting terrorism. The term 'terrorism' was first applied to the Sinhalese JVP which engaged in violence in the south of the country to achieve its demands of social change (Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah 2005: 89) . However, more recently it has been used against the LTTE. Tensions between the Sinhalese and Tamils began to erupt after independence. When the Sinhalese felt that the Tamil community had a disproportionate number of positions in government services, an upsurge of Sinhalese nationalism resulted in discriminatory policies to favour the Sinhalese majority (Kearney 1964: 125; Roberts 1978: 367) . This included the Sinhala Only Act, which made Sinhala the official language of the country (Roberts 1978: 368) . Protests erupted in the Tamil community as they perceived these policies as discriminatory and harming job opportunities for Tamils in Sri Lanka (Manoharan 2006: 13-14) .
When grievances were not met, the Tamil minority called for independence from Sri Lanka, claiming parts of the North-East of the island as their own. Violence erupted in 1983 when the LTTE killed 13 Sri Lankan soldiers (Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah 2005: 89) . The
Sri Lankan Government has since been in repeated conflict with the LTTE (see Samaranayake 1999) . In the history of the conflict between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government, the label 'terrorism' has had three effects: it has de-legitimised the Tamil project; generated domestic Sinhalese support for government actions; and helped the government gain international support (Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah 2005: 91) . The label of terrorism was used to associate the LTTE with the broader Tamil demands for a new state (Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah 2005: 89) . Therefore, the destruction of one also became the destruction of the other. As I show below, these two discourses -nationalist myths and terrorism -have become intertwined and have helped create conditions that have made torture possible.
Counter-Insurgency and Torture?
An ideal site in which to see how discourse can make torture possible is in counterinsurgency operations. Since World War II, counterinsurgency operations have become the dominant form of warfare for many governments around the world (Long 2006; Metz and Millen 2004) . These operations consist of a battle between insurgents and governments that seek to 'control contested political space' (Kilcullen 2006a: 112) . Insurgent tactics are used by groups who are unable to obtain their political objectives through conventional means (Long 2006: 2) . Counterinsurgency, then, is the 'military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency' (U.S.
Department of the Army 2006, 1: 1).
However, counter-insurgency is not just concerned with defeating insurgents who pose a threat to the government's authority and to the social order more generally. Rather, it has a broader function of establishing overall control over society (Kilcullen 2006b: 6) . . It is through this process of identity construction that the insurgent is deemed illegitimate and dangerous. For the counter-insurgent, it must manage and regulate the social order, representing it as natural and beneficial for the population while, at the same time, managing and controlling the identity of the insurgent as a dangerous threat to society.
Although this helps explain how the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE attempted to frame one another as dangerous, it does not explain the use of torture. In public addresses to the international and domestic community, the Sri Lankan government stated it practiced the war in a humane fashion and that it was the LTTE that engaged in barbaric human rights violations. The Sri Lankan government never publicly condoned torture and denied its use.
The Rajapaksa government submitted a report to the U.N. Committee against Torture in 2010 stating, Sri Lanka also notes the Committee's statement that no exceptional circumstances whatsoever may be invoked as a justification for torture. Despite the grave atrocities committed by the LTTE, the Government reiterates that it has at no time sought to invoke any justification for torture nor has it resorted to or acquiesced in acts of torture. As a matter of State policy and practice, the Government maintains a zero tolerance policy on torture, as is evidenced by the meaningful measures taken to curb acts of torture (U.N. Committee against Torture 2010: 6).
If counter-insurgency is about gaining legitimacy, how was torture possible? As I show, the discourses of nationalist myths and the threat of terrorism helped to justify a transgression of the CFA and return to war with the LTTE. This created an extra-ordinary environment that helped justify emergency laws. These laws provided the Sri Lankan army and police forces with an environment of impunity and the necessary cover to engage in torture. The above statement to the U.N. Committee against Torture demonstrates a discourse of un-truth, whereby the Sri Lankan government promoted a positive image of themselves for a domestic and international audience, and then engaged in illegal practices that were deemed militarily useful in winning the war.
In analysing the recent war I have selected documents between 2006 and 2010 such as public statements, interviews, international speeches, and government documents that made reference to the war and post-war reconstruction. I have used English translations for all documents; however, many of the speeches were delivered in Sinhalese, with some being delivered in both Tamil and Sinhalese. These documents had several different audiences.
Firstly, the Sri Lankan government sought to justify themselves to the international community by linking their war with the LTTE to the global 'war on terror.' Secondly, they addressed the Sinhalese community and sought to gain their support by invoking Sinhalese historical myths and narratives. And the third audience was the Tamil community. The government equated the destruction of the LTTE with the broader Tamil separatist project and therefore used war propaganda to destroy the idea of a separate Tamil state.
When examining the documents and speeches I have drawn upon Doty's (1993) work in focusing in particular on the importance predications, presuppositions and subject positioning have in interpreting discourse. Predicates are the attributes attached to an object, such as 'humane' or 'terrorist' (Doty 1993: 306) . Presuppositions refer to background knowledge and help statements make sense (Doty 1993: 306) . And subject positioning places actors in a hierarchical relationship which allocates the actor's agency (Doty 1993: 308) .
These three tools 'provide analytic categories that enable me to get at how discursive practices constitute subjects and objects and organize them into a "grid of intelligibility'" (Doty 1993: 306) .
Returning to War
In order to examine how torture became possible during the recent Sri Lankan conflict, one must analyse the discursive environment that was constructed to legitimise and gain support for the return to war against the LTTE. I argue that the two discourses mentioned above were responsible: namely, invoking nationalist myths and the discourses of terrorism. Both sides in the conflict invoked these discourses and they helped shape a reality that opened up a possibility of practices while closing others. These national discourses were the leading element in creating an environment that made torture possible as they invoked age-old myths that provided the government's discourse with legitimacy in the eyes of the domestic Sinhalese population. Yet they also invoked wider international discourses on terrorism that linked and attempted to legitimise the Sri Lankan conflict with the wider 'war on terror' and associated government victory with freedom for the Tamil community. This made the use of violence against the LTTE possible as well as create an environment for the escalation of violence and de-humanisation of state enemies at the local level. Although I have separated these two discourses for analytical reasons, as one will see, these two discourses are heavily intertwined.
'Defending' Sri Lanka
Nationalism became a prominent theme used by both sides to make sense of the conflict and justify violence against each other and their own ethnic groups. The recent Sri Lankan war represented a battle over the identity and future of the Sri Lankan island. One point at which this contestation surrounded was the question of sovereignty. The Sri Lankan government grafted its identity to Sri Lankan sovereignty whereby one was akin to the other. The Acting
Minister for External Affairs, Gitanjana Gunawardena, stated 'Every State has an equal right to defend itself against threats to its Sovereignty, whether the threat emanates from within its own territory or from outside' (Gunawardena 2010) . By linking the defence of the government with the defence and unity of Sri Lankan sovereignty it excluded the possibility of sharing or demarking sovereignty unless the government itself faced defeat.
In linking sovereignty as a key constitutive element of Sri Lankan government identity, the Rajapaksa government also associated itself with defence of the population, since it is the people that are the true holders of sovereignty in a modern democratic polity.
Addressing an international audience, Rajapaksa declared in a 2008 speech to the 63rd United Nations General Assembly,
What the Government would not, and could not do is to let an illegal and armed terrorist group, the LTTE, to hold a fraction of our population, a part of the Tamil community, hostage to such terror in the northern part of Sri Lanka and deny those people their democratic rights of dissent and free elections (Rajapaksa 2008b ).
This speech was directed at the international community to legitimise both its military intervention against the LTTE, but also to reinforce the government position that Sri Lanka is a unified whole and will not tolerate separatist claims to its sovereignty. It is important to note that Tamils were deemed a population within Sri Lanka, not a population of their own.
Yet these discursive strategies also dissociated the LTTE as being representative of the Tamil community by associating the LTTE with authoritarian rule. By virtue of dissociating the LTTE from the broader Tamil population, the Sri Lankan government came to adopt the sovereign will of all people living within Sri Lanka. The state was deemed the protector of all in Sri Lanka and whereby the nation and the state were deemed to be unified as well. This discourse directed at the international community also overlapped with the discourse directed at the domestic populations in Sri Lanka. The pluralist and inclusive discourse directed at the Tamil population was constructed by dissociating the Tamil community with the LTTE and linking it to a unified Sri Lanka. The Tamil people and the land were under the 'clutches' (Rajapaksa 2008a (Rajapaksa , 2009b and 'the fascist and dictatorial control of the LTTE terrorists' (Bogollagama 2008b ). This invokes ideas of dictatorship, brutality and illegitimacy. The LTTE do not govern, but hold the Tamil population 'hostage,' denying them their democratic rights (Rajapaksa 2009a) . Although the LTTE claim to be representative of the Tamil population, they are really only representative of a 'small group;' namely, those who engage in violence against the Sri Lankan state (Rajapaksa 2007 ).
Yet there also exists a contradiction within the government discourse. The pluralist discourse directed at the Tamils and international community was inclusive and democratic, while the discourse directed at the Sinhalese majority privileged the Sinhalese by re-writing history in a favourable light to Sinhalese nationalism. As scholars have shown, Sri Lanka historically comprised of three kingdoms, one of which was Tamil (DeVotta 2011: 135).
Moreover, this pluralistic discourse did not treat each ethnic group as equal. As Rampton (2011: 256) has argued, Sinhalese nationalism proclaims 'territory, state and nation of the island compose a bounded unity revolving around a majoritarian axis of Sinhala Buddhist religion, language, culture and people.' Cultural aspects of Sinhalese narratives, such as the peasant farmer, were given an important place in government discourse (see Rajapaksa 2008a; see also Rampton 2011: 258) . In an attempt to build a Sinhala dominated nation (Rampton 2011: 267) all other minorities, such as Tamils, were placed in an inferior position and subordinate to the Sinhalese community (Rampton 2011: 256) .
In addition to this subject positioning of the LTTE and Tamil community as inferior to the Sinhalese, boundaries as to the relationship the LTTE had with Sri Lanka were increasingly blurred. The LTTE were represented as a group both inside and outside of Sri Lanka. They were inside in a sense that the war was occurring within the geographical bounds of the island. Yet by constructing the LTTE as illegitimate rulers who did not represent the will of Tamils, they were also cast as outsiders, akin to foreign invaders. By representing the LTTE as both an internal and external threat, the Rajapaksa government However, the LTTE offered a different interpretation of the conflict, seeing it as another case of ethnic oppression by the Sinhalese majority. LTTE public statements referred to the 'Sinhalese' government, making a clear separation between the Tamils and the rest of Sri Lanka, arguing the government did not represent the will of the Tamil people (Ponnambalam 2006) . This was different from the government's discourse in that it sought to challenge the notion promoted by the government that the Tamil community were part of a broader Sri Lankan society, rather than a separate community.
The LTTE accused the 'Sinhala leadership' of 'ethnic genocide' and who sought to 'destroy the rights of Tamils' (TamilNet, 2 August 2006). In conflating the government and the 'Sinhala nation' as one, it promoted a discourse whereby it was the whole country against the Tamils who needed to be defeated in war:
The politics of the Sinhala nation has today taken the form of a monstrous war.
Because the chauvinistic Sinhala regime is putting its trust in a military solution, the war is spreading and is turning more and more intense. Sinhala nation is intent on occupying and enslaving the Tamil homeland. Our military is only involved in a war of self defence against this war of the Sinhala nation (LTTE 2008).
The LTTE engaged in similar divisive nationalist discourse as the Sri Lankan government.
The LTTE claimed the Tamil community could not continue to live under the rule of the 'Sinhala nation' in freedom and dignity. Yet by creating an image of the rest of Sri Lanka as a homogenous whole, and whose only quality was the oppression of Tamils, the stark divisions and tensions between the two identities further escalated the use of force. As the U.N. argued, the 'extreme Tamil nationalism…reinforced Sinhalese nationalism' (U.N.
Secretary-General 2011: 114). Tamil nationalism reaffirmed for the Sinhalese that the LTTE
were an enemy to Sri Lankan 'unity' and represented a group that needed to be destroyed.
'War on Terrorism'
The second major discourse, and intertwined with the first, revolved around the notion that the conflict represented part of the global 'war on terror.' Battles against 'terrorism' are nothing new in Sri Lanka, with the government passing the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1979 in response to JVP violence. However, this recent war was targeted exclusively against the LTTE, and 'terrorism' discourse represented a potent tool in which to justify war.
The Sri Lankan government discourse created a binary opposition between itself and the LTTE that invoked a battle of good versus evil, and this discourse was communicated to the international and domestic audiences. The predicates attributed to the LTTE were not the same throughout the temporal period analysed. Common terms used included 'menace' (Rajapaksa 2008b ) 'terrorist' (see SCOPP 2006 , 2007c , 2008b , 'savage' and 'ruthless' (Rajapaksa 2009b ) 'violent' (Sambandan 2008 ) and 'cannot be trusted' (Rajapaksa 2009a) . However, although these terms are different they are consistent with one another and represent a discourse in the Foucaultian sense. The different statements work together to form a strategy that constructs knowledge and produces meaning. The common theme that runs through the different statements is one of a violent and law-violating actor that seeks to divide and threaten Sri Lanka.
The predicates used by the Sri Lankan government to construct its own identity reflect the opposite of those used to describe the LTTE. The Sri Lankan government is 'democratic' (Sambandan 2008; Rajapaksa 2008a; SCOPP 2006 SCOPP , 2007b and attempts to 'bring about sustainable peace' (Sambandan 2008) while the military is 'humane' (Rajapaksa 2009b) 'disciplined' (Rajapaksa 2007) and 'restrained' (Gunawardena 2010 The LTTE, in spite of the talks, went about on the normal, violent ways they were used to (Sambandan 2008 ).
This discourse was directed at both a domestic and international audience and lasted (Bogollagama 2008b) .
How is this terrorism discourse linked to the widespread practice of torture? It is linked in three ways. First, by making a distinction between the LTTE as terrorists and the broader Tamil population, it denied the LTTE as representing any form of community, making brutal interventions possible. Describing the LTTE as a 'scourge,' the Sri Lankan government invoked a term used by the U.S. administration, which links terrorism with notions of disease that must be destroyed (Jackson 2007: 363) .
The predicates used also stripped the LTTE of any moral qualities. While the government represented themselves as virtuous and humane, ignoring and denying their own human rights violations, the LTTE were cast solely as inhumane. The government focused on the LTTE's immoral and illegal actions such as piracy, recruiting child soldiers, drug smuggling, terrorism and looting (SCOPP 2007a (SCOPP , 2007b . The LTTE exploited schools to recruit child soldiers, and attacked ships that supplied essential food aid for Sri Lankan citizens (such as the Jaffna attack on 6 November 2006) (SCOPP 2007a) . The LTTE showed a complete disregard for human life as they 'indiscriminately' laid land mines without 'concern for international law or civility' (SCOPP 2007a: 1) . Moreover, the LTTE were represented as untrustworthy, breaking their pledges not only to the Sri Lankan government in the peace process but also to UNICEF after they had made commitments to address terrorism and terrorist activities by any person or group of persons, in keeping with its policy to achieve peace.' As I discuss these laws in detail below I will not mention them here.
However, criticisms of these laws were stifled by linking support of these policies with a duty to the nation as a whole. Prime Minister Ratnasiri Wickremanayaka stated, 'The civilians are threatened due to the barbaric attacks of the LTTE…It is our duty to support the Security Forces to eliminate terrorism' (SCOPP 2008a: 5) . This mimics the Bush administration's black and white worldwide that actors were either with or against the U.S. in its 'war on terror' (see Bush 2001) . buffer, shooting and killing those that sought to escape from LTTE controlled areas, using military arms near civilians, forced labour, and suicide attacks that killed civilians (U.N. -General 2011: 65-66) . Moreover, the LTTE undertook an aggressive strategy before and during the war to silence critics and 'traitors' at home and in the diaspora (Human Rights Watch 2006: 17, 18, 24) . This included 'death threats, beatings, property damage, smear campaigns, fabricated criminal charges, and even murder as a consequence of dissent' (Human Rights Watch 2006: 14) . One can see here that terrorist discourses were not only a means to frame and 'make sense' of the current conflict, but were also used as a justification to escalate violence.
Secretary

Making Torture Possible
These discursive practises at the national level created a context that influenced legislative and institutional practices and contributed to creating and sustaining an environment that encouraged torture. The background narratives of ethnic hierarchies and the repeated violence between different groups informed much of the understanding of how to interpret the recent war. The Sri Lankan government constructed the LTTE as a terrorist group unrepresentative of the Tamil community that undermined Sri Lankan unity and needed to be destroyed. The
Sri Lankan government constructed themselves as the saviours of the island and sought to defend its sovereignty and rebuild one nation that was to live in peace and harmony. The abrogation of the Cease Fire Agreement was justified as an act of self-defence and one of last resort, making war appear to be the only feasible option in dealing with the LTTE.
The negative language in both the nationalist and terrorist discourse at the national level encouraged a further escalation of violence at the local level. Both these discourses trapped each actor into seeing the other with enmity and closed off the possibility for peace.
Although sources that help to thoroughly analyse everyday discourses is minimal due to the secret nature of torture, victim accounts of torture in human rights reports provide an insight into how certain violent discourses made torture possible amongst Sri Lankan officials.
Everyday discourses built upon the ethnic hierarchies of the national discourses but were more violent and abusive. Tamils were particularly targeted and de-humanised, with Sri
Lankan officials likening Tamils to animals using predicates such as 'dogs' and 'Tamil bitch' (Human Rights Watch 2013: 67, 76, 82, 87, 136) , a categorisation which has been shown to weaken moral restraints and justify inflicting harm (Haslam 2006: 252-253) . One victim describes how while detained a Sri Lankan officer walked into her cell at night, drunk, and began to sexually assault her. The victim recalls how the officer called her a 'cow' and told her how she 'must have good milk.' When she further resisted, the officer became angry, beat her and began swearing at her in Sinhala. She was then raped (Human Rights Watch 2013: 82) . These predicates reflect the subject positioning used in the national discourses whereby the LTTE were constructed as inferior and worthy of punishment.
The everyday discourses in the torture rooms also reinforced the presuppositions that Sinhala was the main language of Sri Lanka. Sri Lankan officers spoke little or no Tamil to
Tamil detainees, and when Tamil was used it was abusive or slang (Human Rights Watch 2013: 60, 67) . When victims were raped they were also spoken to in Sinhala, a language they often did not understand, reinforcing the superiority and dominance of the Sinhala 'nation' over the Tamil The cultural myths and discourse on terrorism did not explicitly condone torture but it created an environment that encouraged its use. The emergency laws and the creation of subject positioning whereby the Sri Lankan government was deemed superior and virtuous compared to the inferior and dangerous LTTE helped make possible the escalation of violence. The national discourses helped facilitate the police-level discourses that overrode the prohibitions against torture.
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